C39 – 순수 법학 (Reine Rechtslehre, The Pure Theory of Law) / 켈젠(Hans Kelsen, 1881 - 1973)

C39 – 순수 법학 (Reine Rechtslehre, The Pure Theory of Law) / 켈젠(Hans Kelsen, 1881 - 1973) 

(출전: 도서명: 동서고전 200선 해제2 / 편자명: 반덕진 / 출판사명: 가람기획)

철저한 실증주의자이자 민주주의 이론가인 켈젠이 칸트의 존재와 당위 이원론과 법의 강제성 이론을 바탕으로, 실정법 그 자체의 구조를 냉정하게 이론 과학적으로 인식하려는 실정법의 이론을 수립하려 한책. 그 결과 그는 법규의 단계구조상 종국적 가설로서의 근본 규범을 설정했다. 이 책은 민주주의와 직결된 가치상대주의 및 법의 기술성을 전제한 가치판단의 배제라는 점에서, 나치스의 배경하에서 실천적 의의를 지녔을 뿐만 아니라. 법의 본질에 대한 영원한 문제제기이기도 하다.

a. 생애와 작품활동

히틀러가 미국에 선사한 최대의 선물로 알려진 망명학자 한스 켈젠은 오스트리아의 법학자로, 프라하에서 출생하여 빈 대학을 졸업한 후 빈 대학과 쾰른 대학의 교수를 역임했다. 그러나 유대인이라는 신분 때문에 히틀러에 의해 추방되어 스위스로 망명하였다. 그후 오스트리아 신공화국의 정치적인 중심세력이었던 사회민주당의 일원으로서, 신헌법의 기초를 맡았고 또 몇 가지 헌법해설서를 썼다. 1940년에 다시 미국으로 건너가, 하버드에서 2년간 법대강사를 지내고, 교수가 될 수 없게 되자 1942년 이후에는 버클리 대로 옮겨 국제정치학 교수로 활동했다. 그 후 그는 1967년 대학에서 은퇴하고 1973년 작고 했다. 천국 속의 망명이란 말이 있지만 켈젠은 학문적으로 자신의 순수법학이 인정받지 못하는 미국학계에서 외로운 한평생을 보냈다. 그는 한평생 유태인 학자고, 스스로 내면적인 만족에만 산다고 고백하면서, 법철학과 국제법 연구에 일생을 받쳤다. 그는 신 칸트 학파의 방법에서 출발하여 순수법학이라는 독자적 방법을 제창, 빈 학파를 창시하였으며, 자유주의 입장에서 민주주의의 본질과 가치를 규명하였다. 또한, 다수결, 의회주의의 원리를 해명하여 파시즘과 마르크스주의를 비판하였으며, 제2차세계대전 후에는 평화주의, 국제주의, 국제법 우위설의 입장에서 국제법을 강의하였다. 그의 학설은 (국법학의 주요문제) (일반국가학) (순수법학) 등의 저서와 수많은 논문 등을 통해 유럽 대륙법학계에 커다란 파문을 던졌다. 이중 (순수법학)은 제2차대전 전의 그의 학설을 총 결산한 것인데, 그의 견해가 명쾌하게 요약되어 있다. 이책이 출판된 1934년에 유태인이자 자유주의자인 그는 나치의 화를 피해 제네바에 있었다.

b. 켈젠의 헌법관

  헌법에 대한 정의는 헌법을 어떻게 볼 것이냐 하는 헌법관에 따라 달라지는데, 흔히 다음과 같은 3가지의 헌법관이 존재한다. 

    규범주의 헌법관 : 19세기 이후의 국가 철학은 국가를 일정한 가치와 연결시키지 않고, 있는 그대로 이해하는 현상학적 국가관이 주류를 이루어왔다. 그런데 여기서는 헌법을 국가의 조직과 작용에 관한 근본규범으로 정의한다. 이러한 국가관에 의하면 존재와 당위를 엄격히 분리하여 윤리적 문제를 법적 관찰대상에서 제외시킨다. 이 규범주의적 헌법관에 의하면 국가의 존립목적이나 정당성은 헌법의 대상이 될 수 없고 정치의 영역에 속하게 된다. 그리고 국가가 성립하면 그 자체의 정당성을 획득하게 되며, 국가는 스스로의 자기 목적을 갖게 된다. 따라서 국가의 권력과 조직은 기본권과 유리된 통치구조가 되며, 대표적인 학자로는 예리네크, 켈젠 등이다.

    결단주의 헌법관 : 칼 슈미트는 헌법을 헌법제정 권력의 주체가 사회공동체의 종류나 형태에 대하여 내린 근본 결단으로 정의하고 있다. 이 헌법관도 규범주의와 마찬가지로 객관적 가치세계와 단절된 채 이해하고 있으며, 다만 통치구조의 성립에 있어 민주적 정당성이 확보되어야 하며, 통치구조는 국민의 기본권 보장에 그 목적이 있다고 하였다. 또한 근본결단은 혁명이나 다른 결단에 의하여만 변경이 가능하고 헌법 개정에 의해서는 바꿀 수 없다고 본다. 이는 헌법의 생성적 측면을 강조하고, 동시에 민주적 정당성을 강조한 점에서, 그리고 위기시의 이론으로서는 설득력이 있다. 그러나 규범성을 경시하고, 헌법을 너무 순간적으로 이해한 점, 그리고 결단의 과정이 도외시되었다는 점 등의 비판을 받고 있다. 

    종합주의 헌법관 : 스멘드는 국가의 본질을  다양한 이해관계를 지닌 사회공동체가 일정한 가치를 향하여 통합되는 과정으로 이해하고 있다. 그는 국가의 존재근거를 객관적 가치질서에 의해 설명을 시도하며, 동시에 헌법을 통합과정에서의 일체감의 가치적 공통분모를 의미하는 것으로 이해함으로써, 헌법은 당연히 가치적 성격을 지니게 된다. 이 헌법관에 의하면 국민의 기본권 보장이야말로 통합의 원동력 내지 가치지표가 된다. 국가의 통치구조도 기본권 보장과 실현을 위한 것이고, 국가존립의 정당성 및 국가창설의 원동력도 곧 기본권 보장이다. 그러나 규범적 측면을 경시하고 규범을 가치체계에 연결시킴으로써 유동성을 강조한 점, 또 통합이란 국가에만 유일하게 존재하는 것이 아니라는 비판을 받고 있다.

c. (순수 법학)의 내용

  켈젠은 순수법학의 창시자로 유명한데, 여기서 말하는 순수란 법 이론이 논리적으로 자체에 근거하는 것이지. 법 이외의 정치적인 가치에 의존해서는 안된다는 것이다. 

  제1장 (법과 자연) : 법이 사회현상이기는 하지만 사회와 자연과는 전혀 다르다. 따라서 법학이 자연과학이 되지 않기 위해서는 법이 자연에서 명확히 구별되어야 한다. 법은 규범이며 규범과학으로서의 법학은 자연의 인과적 설명을 목표로 하는 과학과는 확실히 구별된다. 순수법학의 견지에서 파악된 법학은 자연의 영역과 명확히 구별된다. 순수법학의 견지에서 파악된 법학은 자연의 영역과 명확히 구별된 의미의 영역에서 특수한 법칙성을 문제삼는다. 

  제2장 (법과 도덕): 법과 도덕을 소박하게 관계 짓는 자연법론과는 달리, 순수법학은 양자를 확실히 구별하고 실정법의 평가를 의식적으로 배척한다. 과학으로서의 법학은 법을 있는 그대로 인식하는 것을 유일한 임무로 하며 순수법학은 반이데올로기적이어야 한다.  

  제3장 (법의 개념과 법규의 이론): 실증주의 견해로 볼 때 법은 외적 강제질서로 파악된다. 이같이 파악되는 것은 일종의 특수한 사회적 기술이며 그 자체는 정치적, 윤리적으로 색채가 없다.

  제4장 (법학의 2원론과 그 극복): 전통적인 법학에서는 객관적인 법, 즉 보통 의미의 법과 주관적인 법, 즉 권리로 구별되어왔다. 후자는 분석에 의해 법 창설에의 참가로써 전자에 환원될 수 있다. 법학에 있어서 제1차적으로 중요한 개념은 권리가 아니라 의무다. 권리주체로서의 인격이라는 개념도 똑같이 해소 된다. 

  제5장 (법질서와 단계구조): 하나의 법질서는 근본규범을 정점으로 한 통일적인 단계구조를 이룬다. 여러가지 국내법 질서는 이 같은 통일성을 지니며 병존하고, 점점 고차적인 법질서로서의 국제법에 의해 통일된다. 법질서의 단계구조를 분석함으로써, 입법, 사법, 행정의 관계, 재판의 기능법 해석의 작용 등 주요문제가 새로운 각광을 받으며 고찰된다.  

  제6장: 해석은 법을 단계적으로 창설하는 과정에서 상위 단계에서 하위단계로 이행할 때 수반되는 정신적 활동이다. 상위 규범의 내용은 하위규범 정립작용을 실체적으로나 수속적으로도 구속한다. 그러나 이 구속은 절대적인 것이 아니라 상위규범. 말하자면 테두리로서의 의의를 갖는 데 불과하다. 이 테두리 가운데는 통상 복수의 선택 가능성이 있으며, 그 중 어느 것을 택하는가는 이론적 인식의 문제가

아니라, 실천적 정책의 문제다. 

  제7장 (법 창설의 방법) : 순수법학은 법질서의 단계구조를 동적으로 고찰하는 데 중점을 둔다. 이 견지에서 보면  공법과 사법 이라는 전통적 구별이 상대화된다. 

  제8장 (법과 국가): 순수법학의 입장에서는 법과 국가의 2원적 대립이 부정되고, 양자의 동일성이 주장된다(법질서로서의 국가의 개념).

제9장 (국가와 국제법): 전통적인 국가주권의 도그마는 국제법과 국내법 관계라는 문제에 대해 국내법 우위를 구성하게 되었다. 그러나 이런 사고방식은 국제법을 부정하는 데 지나지 않는다. 이에 대해 국제법 우위의 구성은 단순히 소극적으로 모순을 포함하고 있지 않다는 이유뿐만 아니라, 적극적인 근거를 지니고 있다. 순수법학은 국가개념을 상대화하여, 모든 법의 인식적 통일을 확립함으로써 중앙집권적 세계질서를 위한 길을 연다.

d. 영향 및 평가

  가치배제 : 켈젠은 한마디로 법의 당위적 측면보다 법의 존재적 측면에 관심을 기울였다. 그는 실정법의 구조적 분석에 주안점을 두었는데, 그 분석은 가치에 관한 모든 윤리적, 정치적 평가로부터 독립되어야 한다. 또 그 분석은 있는 그대로의 법만을 관심대상으로 한다는 점에서 실증적 이라 할 수 있고, 법학을 불순하게 만든  가치와 같은 요소들을 제거한다는 점에서  순수법학 이라 한다.

  법단계설 : 순수한 법이론을 연구한 켈젠의 논지에서는 이성과 자연에 기초를 두는 절대적이고 불변적인 자연법을 배제하고, 실정법만을 대상으로 하지 않으면 안된다. 그는 법을 통일체로서 파악해야 한다며, 법단계설을 제시하고 있다. 즉, 그는 법질서의 내부구조로 상위. 하위의 개념을 인정하고, 하위의 법규는 상위의 법규에 기초하여 창설되고, 따라서 상위의 법은 하위법규의 효력근거라 보았다. 이렇게 단계적 구조의 국내법 질서체계가 곧 국가라고 봄으로써  법과  국가를 동일시하고 있다. 

  오류 : 그러나 그의 순수법 이론은 몇몇 중요한 점에서 오류를 범하고 있다는 것이 학자들의 공통된 견해다. 즉, 당위와 존재를 전혀 별개의 두 영역으로 구별하는 것, 법가치에 대한 합의적 논의의 포기, 국가와 법을 동일시하는 견해 등은 오늘날 지지를 얻지 못하고 있다. 이것 말고도 법의 실체적 내용을 외면했다는 점, 법단계설에서의 근본규범에 대한 설명이 어려운 점 등이 비판을 받고 있다. 그러나 이데올로기로부터의 독립이라는 그 방법론의 강조는 조직적이고 체계적인 구조를 가진 법질서를 고찰하는 학자들로부터 많은 지지를 받고 있다. 또한 근본규범과 그에 부수되는 규범체계의 추구는 법적 실재의 본질에 관심을 가지고, 법학 영역의 명확한 한계를 추구하는 법학자들에게도 큰 도움을 주고 있다. 또한 그의 학설에는 대단히 독창적이면서도 시사로 가득 찬 견해도 적지 않다. 특히 법질서의 단계구조를 동적으로 분석한 것이라든가, 이것을 바탕으로 한 그의 법해석 이론 같은 것은 아직까지도 많은 의의를 지니고 있다. 또 1934년 제네바에서 서술된 본서가 나치스의 폭정과 자유로운 학문을 압박하는 데 대한 과감한 반론이라는 점을 상기할 때, 본서의 역사적 의의는 크다 하겠다.

  정의란 무엇인가 : 켈젠의 또 다른 저서인 (정의란 무엇인가) (1967)는 그가 버클리 대학에서 정년퇴임시 강의한 것으로, 강연내용 외에도 정의에 관한 논문, 성서의 정의관, 플라톤의 정의관, 철학과 정치의 상대주의 인과율과 응보율등의 내용이 담겨 있다. 영원한 물음인 정의에 관해 이만큼 논리적이고 과학적으로 구명한 책이 없어, 법학도들에게는 필독서로 권하고 싶은 책이다. 고별강연에서 그는 인류사상 많은 학자들이 정의를 구명하려고 노력하였지만 모두 실패했다고 지적하고, 그 스스로도 한마디로 정의를 무엇이라 표현할 수 없지만,  나에게 있어서의 정의는 민주주의의 정의, 관용의 정의를 말할 수 있을 뿐 이라 했다. 

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The Pure Theory of Law  (출처 : https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/)

First published Mon Nov 18, 2002; substantive revision Mon Jan 4, 2016

The idea of a Pure Theory of Law was propounded by the formidable Austrian jurist and philosopher Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) (see the bibliographical note). Kelsen began his long career as a legal theorist at the beginning of the 20th century. The traditional legal philosophies at the time, were, Kelsen claimed, hopelessly contaminated with political ideology and moralizing on the one hand, or with attempts to reduce the law to natural or social sciences, on the other hand. He found both of these reductionist endeavors seriously flawed. Instead, Kelsen suggested a ‘pure’ theory of law which would avoid reductionism of any kind. The jurisprudence Kelsen propounded “characterizes itself as a ‘pure’ theory of law because it aims at cognition focused on the law alone” and this purity serves as its “basic methodological principle” (PT1, 7).

1. The Basic Norm

2. Relativism and Reduction

3. The Normativity of Law

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1. The Basic Norm

The main challenge for a theory of law, as Kelsen saw it, is to provide an explanation of legality and the normativity of law, without an attempt to reduce jurisprudence, or “legal science”, to other domains. The law, Kelsen maintained, is basically a scheme of interpretation. Its reality, or objectivity, resides in the sphere of meaning; we attach a legal-normative meaning to certain actions and events in the world (PT1, 10). Suppose, for example, that a new law is enacted by the California legislature. How is it done? Presumably, some people gather in a hall, debate the issue, eventually raise their hands in response to the question of whether they approve a certain document or not, count the number of people who say “yes”, and then promulgate a string of words, etc. Now, of course, the actions and events described here are not the law. To say that the description is of the enactment of a new law is to interpret these actions and events in a certain way. But then, of course, the question is why certain acts or events have such a legal meaning and others don’t?

Kelsen’s answer to this question is surprisingly simple: an act or an event gains its legal-normative meaning by another legal norm that confers this normative meaning on it. An act can create or modify the law if it is created in accordance with another, “higher” legal norm that authorizes its creation in that way. And the “higher” legal norm, in turn, is legally valid if and only if it has been created in accord with yet another, “higher” norm that authorizes its enactment in that way. In other words: it is the law in the United States that the California legislature can enact certain types of laws. But what makes this the law? The California Constitution confers this power on the state legislature to enact laws within certain prescribed boundaries of content and jurisdiction. But then what makes the California Constitution legally valid? The answer is that the legal validity of the Constitution of California derives from an authorization granted by the US Constitution. What makes the US Constitution legally valid? Surely, not the fact that the US Constitution proclaims itself to be “the supreme law of the land”. Any document can say that, but only the particular document of the US Constitution is actually the supreme law in the United States.

The problem is that here the chain of authorization comes to an end: There isn’t a higher legal norm that authorizes the enactment of the (original) US Constitution. At this point, Kelsen famously argued, one must presuppose the legal validity of the Constitution. At some stage, in every legal system, we get to an authorizing norm that has not been authorized by any other legal norm, and thus it has to be presupposed to be legally valid. The normative content of this presupposition is what Kelsen has called the basic norm. The basic norm is the content of the presupposition of the legal validity of the (first, historical) constitution of the relevant legal system (GT, 110–111).

As Kelsen saw it, there is simply no alternative. More precisely, any alternative would violate David Hume’s injunction against deriving an “ought” from an “is”. Hume famously argued that any practical argument that concludes with some prescriptive statement, a statement of the kind that one ought to do this or that, would have to contain at least one prescriptive statement in its premises. If all the premises of an argument are descriptive, telling us what this or that is the case, then there is no prescriptive conclusion that can logically follow. Kelsen took this argument very seriously. He observed that the actions and events that constitute, say, the enactment of a law, are all within the sphere of what “is” the case, they are all within the sphere of actions and events that take place in the world. The law, or legal norms, are within the sphere of “ought”, they are norms that purport to guide conduct. Thus, to get an “ought” type of conclusion from a set of “is” premises, one must point to some “ought” premise in the background, an “ought” that confers the normative meaning on the relevant type of “is”. Since the actual, legal, chain of validity comes to an end, we inevitably reach a point where the “ought” has to be presupposed, and this is the presupposition of the basic norm.

The idea of the basic norm serves three theoretical functions in Kelsen’s theory of law: The first is to ground a non-reductive explanation of legal validity. The second function is to ground a non-reductive explanation of the normativity of law. The third function is to explain the systematic nature of legal norms. These three issues are not un-related.

Kelsen rightly noticed that legal norms necessarily come in systems. There are no free-floating legal norms. If, for example, somebody suggests that “the law requires a will to be attested by two witnesses”, one should always wonder which legal system is talked about; is it US law, Canadian law, German law, or the law in some other legal system? Furthermore, legal systems are themselves organized in a hierarchical structure, manifesting a great deal of complexity but also a certain systematic unity. We talk about Canadian law, or German law, etc., not only because these are separate countries in which there is law. They are also separate legal systems, manifesting a certain cohesion and unity. This systematic unity Kelsen meant to capture by the following two postulates:

Every two norms that ultimately derive their validity from one basic norm belong to the same legal system.

All legal norms of a given legal system ultimately derive their validity from one basic norm.

Whether these two postulates are actually true is a contentious issue. Joseph Raz argued that they are both inaccurate, at best. Two norms can derive their validity from the same basic norm, but fail to belong to the same system as, for example, in case of an orderly secession whereby a new legal system is created by the legal authorization of another. Nor is it necessarily true that all the legally valid norms of a given system derive their validity from the same basic norm (Raz 1979, 127–129).

Be this as it may, even if Kelsen erred about the details of the unity of legal systems, his main insight remains true, and quite important. It is true that law is essentially systematic, and it is also true that the idea of legal validity and law’s systematic nature are very closely linked. Norms are legally valid within a given system, they have to form part of a system of norms that is in force in a given place and time.

This last point brings us to another observation that is central to Kelsen’s theory, about the relations between legal validity and, what he called, “efficacy”. The latter is a term of art in Kelsen’s writings: A norm is efficacious if it is actually (generally) followed by the relevant population. Thus, “a norm is considered to be legally valid”, Kelsen wrote, “on the condition that it belongs to a system of norms, to an order which, on the whole, is efficacious” (GT, 42). So the relationship here is this: efficacy is not a condition of legal validity of individual norms. Any given norm can be legally valid even if nobody follows it. (e.g. think about a new law, just enacted; it is legally valid even if nobody has yet had an opportunity to comply with it.) However, a norm can only be legally valid if it belongs to a system, a legal order, that is by and large actually practiced by a certain population. And thus the idea of legal validity, as Kelsen admits, is closely tied to this reality of a social practice; a legal system exists, as it were, only as a social reality, a reality that consists in the fact that people actually follow certain norms.

What about the basic norm, is efficacy a condition of its validity? One might have thought that Kelsen would have opted for a negative answer here. After all, the basic norm is a presupposition that is logically required to render the validity of law intelligible. This would seem to be the whole point of an anti-reductionist explanation of legal validity: since we cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”, some “ought” must be presupposed in the background that would enable us to interpret certain acts or events as having legal significance. Kelsen, however, quite explicitly admits that efficacy is a condition of the validity of the basic norm: A basic norm is legally valid if and only if it is actually followed in a given population. In fact, as we shall see below, Kelsen had no choice here. And this is precisely why at least one crucial aspect of his anti-reductionism becomes questionable.

2. Relativism and Reduction

Common wisdom has it that Kelsen’s argument for the presupposition of the basic norm takes the form of a Kantian transcendental argument. The structure is as follows:

P is possible only if Q

P is possible (or, possibly P)

Therefore, Q.

In Kelsen’s argument, P stands for the fact that legal norms are “ought” statements , and Q is the presupposition of the basic norm. In other words, the necessary presupposition of the basic norm is derived from the possibility conditions for ascribing legal significance to actions and events. In order to interpret an action as one of creating or modifying the law, it is necessary to show that the relevant legal significance of the act/event is conferred on it by some other legal norm. At some point, as we have noted, we necessarily run out of legal norms that confer the relevant validity on law creating acts, and at that point the legal validity has to be presupposed. The content of this presupposition is the basic norm.

It would be a mistake, however, to look for an explanation of Kelsen’s argument in the logic of Kant’s transcendental argument. (Kelsen himself seems to have changed his views about this over the years; he may have started with a kind of neo-Kantian perspective one can discern in PT1, and gradually shifted to a Humean version of his main argument, which is quite evident in GT. However, this is a very controversial issue; for a different view, see Paulson 2013 and Green 2016.) Kant employed a transcendental argument to establish the necessary presuppositions of some categories and modes of perception that are essential for rational cognition, or so he thought. They form deep, universal, and necessary features of human cognition. Suffice it to recall that it was Hume’s skepticism about knowledge that Kant strove to answer by his transcendental argument. Kelsen, however, remains much closer to Hume’s skeptical views than to Kant’s rationalism. In particular, Kelsen was very skeptical of any objective grounding of morality, Kant’s moral theory included. Kelsen’s view of morality was relativist all the way down. (More on this, below). Second, and not unrelated, as we shall see, Kelsen has explicitly rejected the idea that the basic norm (in law, or of any other normative domain) is something like a necessary feature or category of human cognition. The presupposition of a basic norm is optional. One does not have to accept the normativity of law; anarchism, as a rejection of law’s normative validity is certainly an option, Kelsen maintained. The basic norm is presupposed only by those who accept the “ought”, that is, the normative validity, of the law. But one is not rationally compelled to have this attitude:

The Pure Theory describes the positive law as an objectively valid order and states that this interpretation is possible only under the condition that a basic norm is presupposed…. The Pure Theory, thereby characterizes this interpretation as possible, not necessary, and presents the objective validity of positive law only as conditional—namely conditioned by the presupposed basic norm. (PT2, 217–218)

A comparison to religion, that Kelsen himself offered, might be helpful here. The normative structure of religion is very similar to that of law. It has the same logic: religious beliefs about what one ought to do ultimately derive from one’s beliefs about God’s commands. God’s commands, however, would only have normative validity for those who presuppose the basic norm of their respective religion, namely, that one ought to obey God’s commands. Thus the normativity of religion, like that of the law, rests on the presupposition of its basic norm. But in both cases, as, in fact, with any other normative system, the presupposition of the basic norm is logically required only of those who regard the relevant norms as reasons for their actions. Thus, whether you actually presuppose the relevant basic norm is a matter of choice, it is an ideological option, as it were, not something that is dictated by Reason. Similarly, the normativity of law, presupposed by its basic norm, is optional: “An anarchist, for instance, who denied the validity of the hypothetical basic norm of positive law…. will view its positive regulation of human relationships… as mere power relations” (GT, 413).

Relativism, however, comes with a price. Consider this question: What is the content of the basic norm that one needs to presuppose in order to render positive law intelligible as a normative legal order? The simple answer is that what one presupposes here is precisely the normative validity of positive law, namely, the law that is actually practiced by a certain population. The validity of the basic norm, as we noted briefly earlier, is conditional on its “efficacy”. The content of the basic norm of any given legal system is determined by the actual practices that prevail in the relevant community. As Kelsen himself repeatedly argued, a successful revolution brings about a radical change in the content of the basic norm. Suppose, for example, that in a given legal system the basic norm is that the constitution enacted by Rex One is binding. At a certain point, a coup d’etat takes place and a republican government is successfully installed. At this point, Kelsen admits, ‘one presupposes a new basic norm, no longer the basic norm delegating law making authority to the monarch, but a basic norm delegating authority to the revolutionary government’ (PT1, 59).

Has Kelsen just violated his own adherence to Hume’s injunction against deriving “ought” from an “is” here? One gets the clear impression that Kelsen was aware of a serious difficulty in his position. In both editions of the Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen toys with the idea that perhaps changes in the basic norms of municipal legal systems legally derive from the basic norm of public international law. It is a basic principle of international law that state sovereignty is determined by actual control over a territory/population (PT1 61–62, though in PT2, 214–215, the idea is presented with greater hesitation; notably, some commentators argue that Kelsen took the idea of a universal legal order much more seriously than suggested here—see Green 2016). But this led Kelsen to the rather uncomfortable conclusion that there is only one basic norm in the entire world, namely, the basic norm of public international law. Be this as it may, the main worry lies elsewhere. The worry stems from the fact that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain both a profound relativist and an anti-reductionist position with respect to a given normative domain. If you hold the view that the validity of a type of norms is entirely relative to a certain vantage point—in other words, if what is involved here is only the actual conduct, beliefs/presuppositions and attitudes of people—it becomes very difficult to detach the explanation of that normative validity from the facts that constitute the relevant point of view (namely, the facts about people’s actions, beliefs, attitudes, etc). This is basically what was meant earlier by the comment that Kelsen had no option but to admit that the validity of the basic norm is conditional on its efficacy. The normative relativism which is inherent in Kelsen’s conception forces him to ground the content of the basic norm in the social facts that constitute its content, namely, the facts about actions, beliefs, and attitudes actually entertained by the population in question. And this makes it very questionable that reductionism can be avoided. In fact, what Kelsen really offered us here is an invitation to provide a reductive explanation of the concept of legal validity in terms of some set of social facts, the facts that constitute the content of any given basic norm. (Which is precisely the kind of reduction H.L.A. Hart later offered in his account of the Rules of Recognition as social rules [see Hart 1961, at p. 105, where Hart alludes to the difference between his conception of the rules of recognition and Kelsen’s idea of the basic norm.])

Kelsen’s problem here is not due to the fact that he was a relativist with respect to every normative system, like morality, religion etc.; it is not the scope of his relativism that is relevant to the question of reduction. The problem stems from the fact that Kelsen was quite right about the law. Legal validity is essentially relative to the social facts that constitute the content of the basic norm in each and every legal order. Notice that legal validity is always relative to a time and place. A law enacted by the California legislature only applies within the boundaries of the state of California, and it applies during a certain period of time, after its enactment and until a time when it is modified or repealed. And we can see why: because legal validity is determined by the content of the basic norm that is actually followed in a given society. The laws in UK, for example, are different from those in the US, because people (mostly judges and other officials) actually follow different rules, or basic norms, in Kelsen’s terminology, about what counts as law in their respective jurisdictions. Once Kelsen admits, as he does, that the content of a basic norm is fully determined by practice, it becomes very difficult to understand how the explication of legal validity he offers is non-reductive.

3. The Normativity of Law

Let us now see how Kelsen thought that the basic norm helps to explain the sense in which law is a normative domain and what this normativity consists in. The first and crucial point to realize is that for Kelsen the idea of normativity is tantamount to a genuine “ought”, as it were; it is a justified demand on practical deliberation. A certain content is regarded as normative by an agent if and only if the agent regards that content as a valid reason for action. As Joseph Raz noticed, Kelsen agrees with the Natural Law tradition in this particular respect; both assume that the normativity of law can only be explained as one would explain the normativity of morality, or religion for that matter, namely, in terms of valid reasons for action (Raz 1979, 134–137; but cf. Paulson 2012). But then, the problem for Kelsen is how to explain the difference between the normativity of law and that of morality; if legal “ought” is a genuine “ought”, what makes a legal obligation distinct from a moral one? Kelsen’s answer is that the relevant “ought” is always relative to a given point of view. Each and every type of “ought”, be it religious, moral or legal, must presuppose a certain point of view, a point of view which is constituted by the basic norm of the relevant normative system.

In other words, Kelsen’s conception of legal normativity turns out to be a form of Natural Law completely relativized to a certain point of view. However, in Kelsen’s theory the relevant point of view is distinctly a legal one, not some general conception of morality or Reason. That these two basic norms, or points of view, can come apart, is nicely demonstrated by Kelsen’s comment that “even an anarchist, if he were a professor of law, could describe positive law as a system of valid norms, without having to approve of this law” (PT2 218n). The anarchist does not endorse the legal point of view as one that reflects her own views about what is right and wrong. Anarchism is understood here precisely as a rejection of the normative validity of law; however, even the anarchist can make an argument about what the law in this or that context requires; and when she makes such an argument, she must presuppose the legal point of view, she must argue as if she endorses the basic norm of the relevant legal system. Joseph Raz has called these kinds of statements “detached normative statements”; the anarchist argues as if she endorses the basic norm, without actually endorsing it. Another example that Raz gave is this: suppose that at Catholic priest is an expert in Jewish Law; the priest can make various interpretative arguments about what Jewish law really requires in this or that context. In such a case, the priest must argue as if he endorses the basic norm of Jewish Law, but of course, being a Catholic, he does not really endorse it, it does not reflect his own views about what is right and wrong (Raz 1979, 153–157).

So here is what emerges so far: the concept of normativity, the sense in which normative content is related to reasons for action, is the same across all normative domains. To regard something as normative is to regard it as justified, as a warranted requirement on practical deliberation. However, the difference resides in the difference in points of view. Each basic norm determines, as it were, a certain point of view. So it turns out that normativity (contra Kant) always consists of conditional imperatives: if, and only if, one endorses a certain normative point of view, determined by its basic norm, then the norms that follow from it are reason giving, so to speak. This enables Kelsen to maintain the same understanding of the nature of normativity as Natural Law’s conception, namely, normativity qua reasons for action, without having to conflate the normativity of morality with that of law. In other words, the difference between legal normativity and, say, moral normativity, is not a difference in normativity (viz, about the nature of normativity, per se), but only in the relevant vantage point that is determined by their different basic norms. What makes legal normativity unique is the uniqueness of its point of view, the legal point of view, as it were.

We can set aside the difficulties that such a view raises with respect to morality. Obviously, many philosophers would reject Kelsen’s view that moral reasons for action only apply to those who choose to endorse morality’s basic norm (whatever it may be). Even if Kelsen is quite wrong about this conditional nature of moral imperatives, he may be right about the law. What remains questionable, however, is whether Kelsen succeeds in providing a non-reductive explanation of legal normativity, given the fact that his account of legal validity turned out to be reductive after all. The trouble here is not simply the relativity to a point of view; the trouble resides in Kelsen’s failure to ground the choice of the relevant point of view in anything like Reason or reasons of any kind. By deliberately avoiding any explanation of what it is that might ground an agent’s choice of endorsing the legal point of view, or any given basic norm, Kelsen left the most pressing questions about the normativity of law unanswered. Instead of providing an explanation of what makes the presupposition of the legal point of view rational, or what makes it rational to regard the requirements of law as binding requirements, Kelsen invites us to stop asking.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Kelsen’s academic publications span over almost seven decades in which he published dozens of books and hundreds of articles. Only about a third of this vast literature has been translated to English. Kelsen’s two most important books on the pure theory of law are the first edition of his Reine Rechtslehre, published in 1934 and recently (2002) translated. The second edition, which Kelson published in 1960 (translated in 1967) is a considerably extended version of the first edition. In addition, most of the themes in these two books also appear in Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State. These three works are cited in text as follows:

[PT1]  1934/2002. Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, B.L. Paulson and S.L. Paulson, trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[PT2]  1960/1967. Pure Theory of Law, M. Knight, trans., Berkeley: University of California Press.

[GT]  1945/1961. General Theory of Law and State, A. Wedberg, trans., New York: Russell & Russell.

Other relevant publications in English include What is Justice?, UC Berkeley Press, 1957, ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence’, 55 Harvard L. Rev. (1941), 44, ‘Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law: A Reply’, (1965), 17 Stanford L. Rev. 1128, and ‘On the Pure Theory of Law’ (1966), 1 Israel L. Rev. 1.

For a complete list of Kelsen’s publications that have appeared in English see the Appendix to H. Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (M. Hartney trans.) Oxford, 1991, pp. 440–454.

Secondary Sources

Green, S.M., 2016, “Marmor’s Kelsen”, in D.A. Jeremy Telman (ed.) Hans Kelsen in America. Springer Verlag.

Harris, J.W., 1980, Legal Philosophies, chapter 6, London: Butterworths.

Hart, H.L.A., 1961, The Concept of Law, chapter 3, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

–––, 1970, “Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law”, in H.E. Kiefer and M.K. Munitz (eds), Ethics and Social Justice, pp. 171–199, New York: State University of New York Press.

Marmor, A., 2001, Objective Law and Positive Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

–––, forthcoming, Philosophy of Law, The Princeton Series in the Foundations of Contemporary Philosophy (S. Soames ed.), Chapter 1, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Paulson, S., 2002, Introduction to Kelsen’s Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, p. xvii, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

–––, 2012. “A ‘Justified Normativity’ Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Rejoinders to Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz”. In Matthias Klatt (ed.), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, pp. 61–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

–––, 2013. “The Great Puzzle: Kelsen’s Basic Norm”. In Luis Duarte d’Almeida, John Gardner, and Leslie Green (eds.), Kelsen Revisited: New Essays on the Pure Theory of Law, pp. 43–62. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

Raz, J., 1980, The Concept of a Legal System, (2nd ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

–––, 1979, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm’ in Raz, The Authority of Law, pp. 122–145, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tur, R.H. & Twining, W. (eds), 1986, Essays on Kelsen, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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실정법

위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.

실정법(實定法, 영어: positive law, 라틴어: ius positum)은 일반적으로 새로운 권리를 만드는 법이다. 다시 말해, 경험적이고 역사적인 사실을 통하여 현실적인 제도로 시행되는 법을 말한다. 이는 생득법, 즉 입법을 통해 만들어진 것이 아닌 법을 말하는 자연법과는 대비된다